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Abstract
Power relations within the area of blockchain
governance are complex by definition and a
comprehensive analysis that links technological and
institutional elements is missing to date. The research
that is presented with this article focuses on the
visualization of the shifting power relations with the
introduction of blockchain. For this purpose, the
analysis leverages an adjusted version of the multistakeholder influence mapping tool. The analysis
considers the various stakeholders within the multilayered blockchain technology stack and compares
three fundamental blockchain scenarios, including
public and private blockchain settings.
The findings show that public administrations
face indeed less power with the introduction of
blockchain, while new stakeholders come into play
who wield influence rather uncontrolled. Nonetheless,
public administrations are not powerless overall and
remain influential stakeholders. This paper concludes
that blockchain governance is not as democratic as
blockchain enthusiasts tend to argue and derives
corresponding opportunities for further research.

1. Introduction
Public
administrations
and
political
representatives regard joint efforts between public and
non-public stakeholders to produce public services as
increasingly important. This is a reaction to pressing
topics resting inside and outside public
administrations, such as scarce public funds, limited
internal resources, eroding trust of society and
challenges of globalization. A prime example for the
current need of collaboration between public and nonpublic stakeholders is the ongoing global health crisis
due to COVID-19. Observed governmental responses
(e.g. [1]) actively ask for a close collaboration between
public health authorities and citizens with combined
resources in order to co-produce public health
services. In general, this governance-focused
paradigm is often referred to as New Public
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Governance [2]. A successful implementation of this
paradigm also requires the ability to cope and align
with multiple involved stakeholders.
There are already various solutions of information
technology (IT) available to support collaborative
modes of working. However, the technology of
blockchain takes the discussion of scholars and
practitioners to another level because this technology
is attributed to act as an institutional technology [3].
Scholars of IT often claim it could fundamentally
redefine stakeholder interactions by offering secure
peer-to-peer working styles and thereby even improve
democracy [4]. Advocates of blockchain also question
the role of public administration. At the same time, the
discussion around the institutional consequences of
blockchain is rather unstructured. It is the
technological complexity and the high number of
relevant stakeholders on governance level that makes
it difficult to understand the technology itself and
corresponding power relations. For this reason, further
research is demanded that links technological and
institutional perspectives [5].
The research presented with this article aims to
structure and visualize the shifting power relations in
the area of blockchain governance by applying
comprehensive stakeholder analysis techniques, such
as multi-level stakeholder influence mapping tool [6].
Furthermore, the research seeks to evaluate
possibilities and limitations of public administrations
to influence the development of blockchain-based
public services.
This article summarizes the efforts and results of
this research. First, the theoretical foundations of this
research are laid out with an overview of
interorganizational public service delivery and the
blockchain technology. Second, the design of this
research is introduced in greater detail by describing
the applied step-by-step approach. Third, major
findings are then examined and discussed. And finally,
conclusions are drawn with respect to the aim of this
research before limitations to the results and
opportunities for further research are discussed.
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2. Background
This chapter elaborates on the theoretical
foundations of this article. First, the shift from
intraorganizational
towards
interorganizational
governance is presented and amplified with a
discussion on the role of power and e-governance.
Second, the foundations of the blockchain technology
are introduced. These also include elaborations on the
matters of blockchain governance and the
technology’s multiple stack layers.

2.1. Public service delivery – towards
interorganizational governance
Public administrations offer public goods and
services to their various stakeholders and expect them
to follow their rules and to pay tax. The public
administrations do so as they largely rely on laws and
potential penalties these may include [7]. They
provide those goods and services with limited
capacities. Especially time, funds and knowledge
about the interdependences of service provisioning are
scarce [8, 9]. Latter limitation should not surprise
when multiple stakeholders are involved or even
national boundaries are crossed [10] in consequence of
e.g. technologies that know no borders or supply
chains that easily span across nations [11, 12].
Additionally, private actors increasingly engage as
public service providers [9]. Thus, the number of
elements of a public service increases which makes it
harder to predict and control the service outcomes, i.e.
the complexity increases [13, 14].
As one of the most recent and popular public
sector reforms, New Public Management fails to offer
adequate responses to these constraints due to its
intraorganizational focus on efficiency [15].
Accordingly, new approaches are required that
consider the shifting roles [16] and tackle the growing
interorganizational governance efforts within the
public service delivery system [10]. Collaborative
forms of governance have thereby gained significant
importance in public sector reforms [17] because
traditional patterns of policy making, e.g. top-down
decision-making or confrontation, appear to be hardly
suitable for recent challenges [18]. These forms seek
to resolve conflicts and facilitate cooperation among
public and non-public stakeholders [19] in order to
improve efficiency and quality of public services. This
governance-focused paradigm is also referred to as
New Public Governance. With New Public
Governance, public and non-public stakeholders
combine their resources to provide public services in
co-production [2].

Indeed, this would be a promising development.
At the same time, this development presents “a
challenge to the role of government” [15] which
requires careful examination. When activities are not
provided by public administration any longer, but
instead by non-public stakeholders, this raises
concerns in terms of e.g. accountability, legitimacy
[15] or governability of the societal system [11]. There
are many factors that could influence this complex
governance system and which can only be partly
controlled by the governing system [11]. Stakeholders
are likely to bring in diverging sets of e.g. goals,
capacities, interests and dependencies [10]. This may
give reason for “conflicts and power issues” [20]
leading to challenging coordination and balancing
efforts [21] to finally jointly provide public services.
Companies could either struggle in case they have to
follow divergent laws of multiple jurisdictions or
assume a superior role if they can rely on a large-scale
organization and corresponding resources, while latter
scenario is rather common practice and not theoretical
thought experiment [21]. In summary, effective
strategies for coordination and cooperation in
governance networks are essential to prevent
unbalanced actions, the abuse of power by
stakeholders or an inadequate provision of public
services [22].
Consequently, power and influence are two
important factors in governance networks. The two
concepts are closely linked with each other but still can
be clearly distinguished. Both concepts strive for the
achievement of one’s actor interest. In contrast to the
power, influence can achieve the interests without any
forces or sanctions [23, 24]. Using power always
means to rely on a basis of power, e.g. knowledge,
resources [6] or authority. Interestingly, where power
and influence lie and how they are “conceived in
studies of governance and institutions is often not
discussed.” [6] This issue needs to be tackled when
stakeholders apparently play an increasing role in
governance networks. It can help to better understand
stakeholder relationships within governance networks
and, subsequently, support the design of proper
governance models [6].
The analysis of stakeholders in governance
networks that follow the concept of New Public
Governance should also consider the use of IT.
Electronic government is widely integrated in today’s
governmental processes of policymaking and policy
implementation [25]. Thus, transforming a public
administration would go along with a complementary
transformation of IT. The benefits of IT for
governance purposes, or e-governance, is already
being discussed today. There are claims e-governance
could result in intrinsically changed relationships in
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society and “help to achieve democratic means and
even transform people’s social and political
consciousness.” [26] Furthermore, e-governance
should e.g. increase the efficiency, the accessibility of
data and also enable a power shift from governments
to individuals [4].
Interestingly, the idea of conflicting interests and
powers relations within collaborative governance
networks to provide public services needs to be
expanded onto the technology level [4]. The more
stakeholders are involved with their own IT capacities,
the higher the overall dependence on these IT assets
[21]. And due to high complexities in IT provisioning
(e.g. cloud-based public services operated by third
parties in data centers across the world), it is hard to
tell where power lies in the end [4]. Elsner [21] already
claimed years ago that an analysis should focus on the
roles of power. This claim still holds true because the
rather new technology of blockchain raises high hopes
to fundamentally change the interactions among
stakeholders. Does the introduction of blockchain
represent a shift in powers for the provision of public
services? In which direction – vertically and
horizontally?

2.2. Blockchain – the institutional technology
of governance
Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology
which allows to securely transfer digital assets of any
kind from one user to another in a peer-to-peer fashion.
Thus, it can be applied to a variety of fields of
application [27]. The most prominent use of
blockchain can be observed within the field of
cryptocurrencies, e.g. Bitcoin or Ether as being two
well-known cryptocurrencies. Essentially, blockchain
is a network of nodes that stores continuously updated
and synchronized data based on predefined rules every
node agreed to. Self-executable programs, so-called
smart contracts, further improve the efficiency of
transactions [28] and reduce the need of human
intervention.
Although blockchain is described by an
alternating number of characteristics [29], there are
four essential characteristics which in combination
build the strength of this technology [30]: immutable
data as a result of cryptography and the unique design
of blocks, decentralized and bidirectional exchange
between users without an intermediary, consensus
among nodes that the stored data is accurate and a
transparent history of all transactions [30].
Furthermore, blockchain is not a monolithic
system. It rather is an ecosystem of multiple,
interconnected layers [28]. There are different
approaches to organize the layers depending on

whether it should only entail technical layers or also
institutional layers [31]. With regard to this article’s
aim, it was decided to rely on the technical layers. The
sum of all technical layers will be called blockchain
technology stack [32, 33] in the following. Table 1
introduces the layers of the blockchain technology
stack and presents a brief description per layer.
Table 1. Layers of the blockchain
technology stack
Technology
Brief description
stack layer
Application
This layer sits on top of the
blockchain layer and includes socalled decentralized applications
(DApps)
and
supporting
application frameworks. DApps
are stored on the blockchain and
executed by the nodes [28].
Stakeholders at this level can be
e.g. software developers or end
users.
Blockchain
This layer essentially includes the
consensus mechanism of the
blockchain network [28, 34], e.g.
proof-of-work
or
proof-ofauthority. It contains the rules
how transactions are validated
and subsequently stored by the
nodes [31]. Also, fundamental
characteristics of a blockchain
network, such as permissionless
access, can be assigned to this
layer. Stakeholders at this level
can be e.g. node operators or core
software developers.
Internet
This is the bottom layer. It is
crucial for the blockchain
network which requires constant
internet connectivity in order to
operate
properly
[35].
Stakeholders at this level can be
e.g. internet service providers or
public administrations in the role
of regulators.
The essential blockchain characteristics of this
multi-layered network have been leading to an
increasing interest in blockchain among scientists and
practitioners [36]. Because blockchain represents a
fundamental change of user interaction and its
presumed impact on common roles, with
intermediaries being potentially eliminated [37], this
technology is perceived as an institutional technology
of governance [34]. Intermediaries, it is argued, may
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often leverage information asymmetry out of selfinterest or in “inefficient, or corrupt ways.” [38] While
blockchain is thus presented as the solution to these
issues, others argue (e.g. [39]) the introduction of
blockchain may give rise to new challenges to
overcome self-interest of stakeholders.
In general, potentials to use and participate in a
blockchain network depend on configuration where
two fundamentals can be distinguished. A public and
permissionless blockchain solution (e.g. Bitcoin or
Ethereum) is open to any individual or organization
that wants to use, operate or further develop the
network for their individual reasons. A public
blockchain can be accessed globally, not bound by
borders, which makes it hard for single public entities
to enforce the law of their own jurisdiction. Adequate
governance of this network appears to be challenging
due to its open nature [40]. In contrast to public
blockchains, private blockchains seem easier to handle
in terms of governance. They rely on central
authorities, normally the owners of the networks
organized in a consortium, who have the say when it
comes to fundamental decisions and they also decide
on user access and privileges [5, 28]. But it is precisely
the centralized setup which leaves room for criticism
since it could be interpreted as a contradiction to
blockchain’s idea of decentralization [28]. However,
owners rely on the private setup in hope for efficiency
gains [28] and increased governability [41].
There is a larger consensus among scientists that
the choice to go for a public or private blockchain
influences the governability of a blockchain network.
However, this is a rather vague conclusion of the
institutional consequences and the roles that are likely
to change. Proper scientific analyses are rare to date.
This is not surprising because most scientists still
focus on cryptocurrencies and technical issues of
blockchain [36]. Therefore, it is argued in favor of
further assessments [40, 42]. This seems necessary to
better understand the effects on governance associated
with the selection of either private or public
blockchains and to pinpoint “risks and drawbacks”
[40], wherever they occur. This could provide handson orientation to scientists and practitioners alike and
contribute to the discussion on blockchain governance
models.
Blockchain governance essentially refers to two
principles: governance by blockchain and governance
of blockchain [35]. When blockchain is leveraged to
govern non-technical, functional processes (e.g.
collaborative public services between a public
administration and its citizens) or organizations, this
governance is achieved by the use of blockchain.
Blockchain itself requires its own governance
structures and processes because it is in a constant

process of development, operation and maintenance
[5]. This is referred to as governance of blockchain.
Governance decisions affecting the blockchain
network can have an impact on the qualities of
governance by blockchain.
On-chain or off-chain procedures can be applied
to implement governance by or of blockchain. Onchain governance refers to technical rules directly
embedded into the code allowing a more efficient and
strict way of implementation [28, 35]. For instance,
rules embedded on the blockchain layer will be
mandatory for the upper application layer and its
DApps and frameworks. Processes and other forces of
off-chain governance, however, affect a blockchain
network and its stakeholders from the outside [35].
These forces, e.g. national laws or informal rules of
communities, “operate at the social and institutional
level, rather than at the technical level.” [35]
Consequently, the human factor comes into play
which makes off-chain governance more complex and
less predictable than on-chain governance.
The social and institutional factor at governance
level presents a challenge to blockchain networks. The
initial intention of blockchain enthusiasts was to take
away power from centralized stakeholders and
distribute the power to many other individuals [28],
“enabling a more even distribution of power and
wealth… [and leading] to increased participation and
public engagement.” [35] This belief is to be
challenged with respect to the stakeholders at each
blockchain stack layer. Governance of blockchain
partly requires new roles, e.g. core software
developers of public blockchains, that coexist with
established roles. So, there might be a shift of power
from today’s centralized stakeholders. But this brings
up two questions: How much power is shifted really?
Are there new powerful centralized stakeholders
instead of an even distribution of power?
Some scientists already estimate that blockchain
networks could give rise to oligarchies at technology
level [35, 42, 43] who could ultimately impact nonblockchain related, functional or political governance
decisions. Power would be “still divided unequally.”
[44] It is the aim of this article to examine these claims
by a clear presentation of possible new power relations
in blockchain networks.

3. Methodology
This chapter introduces the methodology,
including a step-by-step process description. This
methodology is built on multiple complementary tools
of stakeholder analysis. It is this mix of tools that
allows to achieve this article’s aim of structuring and
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visualizing shifting power relations among
stakeholders.
It was concluded in the previous chapter that
stakeholder analysis is often neglected within
governance sciences. Not surprisingly, the number of
tools for practitioners and researchers alike to
understand power relations and define appropriate
measures [6] to shape governance models is limited.
Within the area of stakeholder analysis, however, the
decisional method provides a promising approach to
gain this understanding by considering qualitative data
and investigating “power according to [stakeholders’]
participation in decision-making.” [45] This method
contains tools like the power versus interest grid, bases
of power and direction of interest diagram and the
stakeholder influence mapping [45]. It is the adoption
of latter by Sova et al. [6], in particular, that offers a
valuable methodological foundation for this article’s
research – the Multi-level Stakeholder Influence
Mapping (MSIM).
Similar to the stakeholder influence mapping
(SIM), MSIM seeks to analyze the relationship of
stakeholders or stakeholder groups towards a decisionmaking scenario or policy focus “within complex
system regimes.” [6] It does not primarily aim at
investigating the relationship among stakeholders.
These relationships are only relevant by extension [6].
The influence of one stakeholder on the policy focus
is of particular interest [46]. The enhancement and
great advantage of MSIM over SIM lies in its ability
to create an comprehensive view on one policy focus
spanning across multiple stakeholder levels [6].
Depending on the level of aggregation, results of
the stakeholder analysis merge into one or more visual
maps, each containing individual stakeholder
characteristics, including the relevant stakeholders and
their group size, “the degree of influence that they hold
over the [scenario], and their relationships with each
other.” [46] The closeness of stakeholders to one
another displays the degree of potential conflict or
cooperation [6].
To gather those stakeholder characteristics, the
commonly used step-by-step approach needs
adjustments to meet the article’s aim in response to the
low number of available blockchain implementations
in the public sector. The original interview-based
approach which would allow to identify stakeholders,
their group size and influence is, thus, replaced by a
comprehensive desk research in combination with the
additional use of tools of stakeholder analysis. The
following adjusted, stepwise MSIM approach was
applied for this research:
Step 1: Define policy focus. The policy focus
reflects the overall issue in scope [46] of this research.
The influence of stakeholders is measured by the

stakeholder’s influence on the policy. Because this
research seeks to compare blockchain and nonblockchain scenarios, the policy focus needs to be
framed more general and not exclusively to meet
blockchain scenarios. Consequently, the policy focus
for this research is phrased “Establishing and making
adjustments to domestic public service”.
Step 2: Define scenarios. Scenarios are usually
defined to understand the development of stakeholder
influence on a policy focus over time [6]. In this
research, those scenarios are derived from the three
fundamental options to use or not to use blockchain:
Private blockchain, public blockchain and
conventional use of IT, i.e. no blockchain is used.
To increase the usability of this research’s results,
existing blockchain implementations were considered.
With respect to the private blockchain, the Swedish
Mapping, Cadastral and Land Registration Authority
implemented a solution to transfer land titles. The
public blockchain scenario is represented by the
Ministry for Education and Employment of Malta that
implemented a solution to issue and authenticate
educational credentials. The conventional scenario is
based on characteristics of the IT of both the Swedish
and Maltese public administrations (e.g. use of cloud
services by third parties) gathered by literature
research to support a before and after comparison as
realistic as possible.
Step 3: Identify appropriate stakeholder levels.
As shown with section 2.2, the blockchain network is
not a monolithic system. It rather consists of three
essential stack layers, i.e. application layer, blockchain
layer and internet layer. These stack layers can be
applied to the private and public blockchain scenarios.
Correspondingly, appropriate layers for the
conventional scenario are application layer, public
administration infrastructure layer and internet layer.
Latter layer refers to the same layer as within the
blockchain scenarios. In contrast to blockchain’s
decentralized application layer, the conventional
application layer is rather focused on centralized
applications. Additionally, the public administration
infrastructure layer is founded on the widely exercised
Do-It-Yourself approach of public administrations to
run their own IT development and operations units
supported by third parties.
Step 4: Identify stakeholders. An extensive
literature review on (non-)blockchain stakeholders
was conducted. The literature revealed a wide range of
stakeholders for blockchain in general, but some of
them appeared not be relevant for the respective
scenarios. Only stakeholders relevant for at least one
scenario were considered going forward and mapped
to each scenario and layer, if applicable. Results were
noted in a stakeholder list.
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Step 5: Estimate group size. For each relevant
stakeholder, the group size was estimated and
classified in categories of “smallest”, “small”, “big”
and “biggest”. The information per stakeholder was
added to the stakeholder list.
Step 6: Determine stakeholder influence and
relationships. This is a key step of this methodology
and a divergence from the conventional MSIM
methodology. Instead of relying on interviews to
gather opinions from individuals, there was another
extensive literature review conducted on the relevant
stakeholders. The aim was to explore and structure the
broader scientific opinion on the interests and power
base of each stakeholder at each stack layer in each
scenario by leveraging the “bases of power and
directions of interest” tool [47]. There are especially
the bases of power, e.g. in the shape of coercion, legal
force, knowledge or resources [6, 48, 49], that decide
whether a stakeholder is rather likely to safeguard its
interest compared to other involved stakeholders. This
is crucial to substantiate the decision on a
stakeholder’s influence [47]. Furthermore, possibly
identified similarities or differences between
stakeholders can be used to estimate the closeness
among them. The stakeholder information on power
and interests was then again added to the stakeholder
list.
Step 7: Assign stakeholder ranking. This step
involves the assignment of a relative ranking to a
stakeholder within each scenario and stack layer. This
assignment is based on the evaluation of the different
bases of power and directions of interest of each
stakeholder. A stakeholder’s influence on the policy
focus is ranked higher, when this stakeholder e.g. has
relevant legal authority to enforce its interests. In
contrast, another stakeholder may be in a contractual
relationship which rather coerces this stakeholder to
follow the will of others. “The [stakeholder] placed
lowest received a ranking score of 1, the second lowest
a score of 2” [6] and so on. Stakeholders can also
receive the same ranking score. This variable is
referred to as relative ranking (R). Once the
assignment is completed, influence maps per stack
layer can be created.
Step 8: Calculate influence score. The influence
score (InfS) is the most relevant stakeholder variable
for this research. The influence score is an aggregated
variable answering the question what the overall
influence of one particular stakeholder is on a scenario
– regardless of the frequency this stakeholder was
identified as relevant in a scenario. Because the
number of stakeholders can vary across stack layers in
a scenario, it is important to transfer the relative
rankings of a stakeholder into an adjusted ranking
score (Ra) on scenario level. This is the base to

calculate the influence score of each stakeholder. At
the end of the calculation, the influence map per
scenario level can be created.
Step 9: Compare scenarios. In order to
understand the changing power relations across
scenarios, an adequate method to compare the
stakeholder influence across scenarios was designed.
Instead of adding another number to this qualitative
research, it was decided to use a qualitative scale
ranging from “High influence” at the top to “Low
influence” at the bottom. This scale was applied to the
calculated influence score derived within step 8.
Level
Sample outcomes – Public Administration [PA]
Technology Stack
Policy
Individual
focus
technology stack
PA; R= 3
layer
PA; R = 3
Outcome:
Relative ranking
(R) per layer
Scenario
Aggregated
technology stack
layers

PA; R = 1
Application

Outcome:
Compared
influence scores

Internet

Private Blockchain

PA; InfS = 2,7

Outcome:
Influence Score
(InfS)
Cross-Scenario
Comparison of
scenarios

Blockchain

Conventional IT
High
influence

Private Blockchain
High
influence

Public Blockchain
High
influence

PA
PA
PA
Low
influence

Low
influence

Low
influence

Figure 1. Evolving influence analysis from
bottom to top level
In summary, this approach not only provides
insights into each stack layer, but also allows an
aggregation from the bottom to the top. Figure 1
illustrates the expected result types for each level and
how those result types are linked between the levels.

4. Results and discussion
This chapter presents the major results obtained
by applying the methodology presented in the third
chapter and puts them into perspective. More details
on all relevant stakeholders and scenarios, including
influence maps, influence scores and rankings, are
provided as supplemental files alongside this article.
The results of this research show that there are
eleven relevant stakeholders to consider across all
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three scenarios. The composition reflects the different
roles within a scenario and stack layer, and diverging
characteristics of a stakeholder. For example, it was
decided to split “end user” into two stakeholder groups
consisting of “end user (citizens)” and “end user
(company)” due to significant differences in group
size and bases of power, which could impact the
analysis.
The data of this analysis shows that the number of
relevant stakeholders varies across all scenarios and
stack layers. Most stakeholders could be identified
within the public blockchain scenario whereas the
conventional IT scenarios contains the least number of
stakeholders. Also, stakeholders are not constantly
relevant within and across scenarios, although the
frequency of appearance does not necessarily correlate
with the stakeholder’s overall influence. Interestingly,
even the group size of one stakeholder can fluctuate
depending on the scenario. Thus, a particular group
size should not be taken for granted when designing
governance models.
Conventional IT
High
influence
PA

Private Blockchain
High
influence

Public Blockchain
High
influence

PA

PA
FL/R

ITSP
EU [Co]
ISP
EU [Cit]

CSD; SD
M [P]
ITSP
M [I]
EU [Cit]; EU [Co];
ISP; NO

SD; ISP
EU [Co]
NO; EU [Cit];
FL/R

SD; FL/R;
ITSP

Low
influence

Low
influence

Key (Stakeholder)
CSD
Core Software Developer
EU [Cit] End User [Citizen]
EU [Co] End User [Company]
FL/R
Foreign Legislator / Regulator
ISP
Internet Service Provider

ITSP
M [I]
M [P]
NO
PA
SD

Low
influence
IT Service Provider
Miner [Individual]
Miner [Pool]
Node Operator
Public Administration
Software Developer

Figure 2. Comparison of stakeholder
influence across scenarios
For public administrations, opportunities for
decision-making constantly decrease from the
conventional IT, through the private to the public
blockchain scenario (see Figure 2). This is
understandable because they gradually lose ownership
of IT and other stakeholders can make decisions on
issues that were formerly solely decided by public
administrations. This is especially true with respect to
the public blockchain of Malta. In this public
blockchain scenario, the Maltese public administration
can hardly influence what decisions should be made
and how this should happen. Large stakeholder

groups, mainly positioned outside the Maltese
jurisdiction, make it difficult for the Maltese public
administration to ensure its demands are considered.
On the blockchain stack layer, in particular, other
stakeholders, i.e. core software developer, mining
pools and foreign regulators, seem to set the agenda
(see Figure 3). This is a major change compared to the
conventional IT scenario.
Conventional IT
PA Infrastructure

Private blockchain
Blockchain

Policy
focus

Public blockchain
Blockchain

Policy
focus

Policy
focus

PA

PA
ITSP

ITSP

NO
Key (Stakeholder)
CSD
Core Software Developer
M [P]
FL/R Foreign Legislator / Regulator NO
ITSP
IT Service Provider
PA
M [I] Miner [Individual]

CSD
M[P]
FL/R
NO

PA

M[I]

Miner [Pool]
Node Operator
Public Administration

Figure 3. Comparison of the middle layers of
the technology stack
Overall, public administrations seem to have less
power but they are not powerless. Because the
Swedish and Maltese public administrations could act
on all stack layers to a certain extent, makes them
influential players nonetheless. In contrast, end users
(citizens and companies) only play a minor role, if any,
when it comes to influencing blockchain-related
events or taking part in decision-making processes.
Apparently, civic end users cannot leverage their sheer
group size to push their manifold interests.
Finally, IT service providers gain influence from
their valuable resources and capacities they bring in.
Public administrations struggle and hesitate to recruit
such specialized and rare professionals. IT service
provider fill this gap and act as co-producers of public
services [50].

5. Conclusion
The research presented with this article aimed to
gain a deeper understanding of the shifting power
relations within the area of blockchain governance to
deliver public services. For this purpose, the power
relations among relevant stakeholders were visualized
and the possibilities and limitations of public
administrations, in particular, to influence the
development of blockchain-based public services
evaluated.
The results allow a tangible picture of the shifting
power relations, as intended. It was shown that public
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administrations are not powerless in any scenario.
Compared to conventional IT solutions, however, their
possibilities decrease especially with the use of public
blockchains. Furthermore, limitations in decision
making on all layers of the blockchain technology
stack became apparent. Public administrations would
need to enter into transnational partnerships to
effectively increase the influence on public
blockchains.
The results indicate that public administrations
should rather leverage private blockchain solutions if
they are interested in keeping control. At the same
time, private blockchains could mean higher initial
costs because of additional efforts to set up consortium
partnerships and the need for dedicated IT
infrastructure. From a research perspective, a rising
number of private blockchains increases the
importance of interoperability to interlink private
blockchains and, thereby, strengthen the usability of
blockchain-based solutions.
The decision to either use private or public
blockchains is not only a technical one. It may also
impact the development of public services based on
collaborative governance. Public blockchains,
especially Bitcoin, are not tools to support truly
democratic governance procedures. As long as
citizens, who represent the largest stakeholder group
by far, have little or no opportunity to participate in
this development, the development of blockchain
networks remains a task of a few, privileged
stakeholders. For the time being, public
administrations could make a difference by choosing
private blockchains and designing more inclusive
governance models. Consequently, further research
should elaborate on the ways to include citizens or
adequate representatives in the process of blockchain
governance.
Although this research was carefully conducted,
there are two limitations to the findings. First of all,
the data basis for the presented results is only partly
empirical. There are very limited implementations
within the public sector available which consequently
narrows the experience of relevant stakeholders with
matters of blockchain governance. Second, the
calculation of the stakeholder influence scores is the
result of qualitative methods of stakeholder analysis.
As with any other qualitative method, this allows
deviations with respect to the accuracy. To tackle both
limitations, it is suggested to conduct interviews with
relevant stakeholders, once available in sufficient
numbers, to analyze the perceptions of those directly
affected. This would allow the results of this research
to be reviewed.
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